TO
BOMB OR NOT TO BOMB: Atomic Age Policy Initiative
You and the other members of your group
are close advisors to President Harry Truman in 1945. You are currently working
with a team of scientists to help the President decide whether or not the
United States should use this new weapon, the atomic bomb, or invade Japan in
November like previously scheduled.
Use all necessary evidence to decide
what policy the president should follow.
You will have 10 minutes to convince the
president (me) of the efficacy of your decision.
Your presentation must be in the first
person!!!
Your policy
recommendations must also include the following: a clear statement of whether
or not the bomb should be dropped, the reasoning behind that decision with
specific references to sources (“According to…”), and the potential
outcome of your decision…meaning, what will happen (think into the future)
if we follow your policy advice?
Debate
on Dropping the Atomic Bomb: Some Sources
1. Unanimous resolution of the League of Nations
Assembly, Protection of Civilian Populations Against Bombing From
the Air in Case of War, League of Nations, September 30, 1938
Considering that
on numerous occasions public opinion has expressed through the most
authoritative channels its horror of the bombing of civilian populations;…
I. Recognizes the
following principles as a necessary basis for any subsequent regulations:
1) The intentional
bombing of civilian populations is illegal;
2) Objectives aimed at from the air must be legitimate military objectives and must be identifiable;
3) Any attack on legitimate military objectives must be carried out in such a way that civilian populations in the neighbourhood are not bombed through negligence.
2) Objectives aimed at from the air must be legitimate military objectives and must be identifiable;
3) Any attack on legitimate military objectives must be carried out in such a way that civilian populations in the neighbourhood are not bombed through negligence.
2. Appeal of President Franklin D. Roosevelt on Aerial
Bombardment of Civilian Populations, September 1, 1939
….If resort is had
to this form of inhuman barbarism [The ruthless bombing from the air of
civilians in unfortified centers of population] during the period of the tragic
conflagration with which the world is now confronted, hundreds of thousands of
innocent human beings who have no responsibility for, and who are not even
remotely participating in, the hostilities which have now broken out, will lose
their lives. I am therefore addressing this urgent appeal to every government
which may be engaged in hostilities publicly to affirm its determination that
its armed forces shall in no event, and under no circumstances, undertake the
bombardment from the air of civilian populations or of unfortified cities,….
3. 7/25/45 Truman’s Diary
"We met at 11
A.M. today. That is Stalin, Churchill and the U.S. President. But I had a most
important session with Lord Mountbattan & General Marshall before than. We
have discovered the most terrible bomb in the history of the world. It may be
the fire destruction prophesied in the Euphrates Valley Era, after Noah and his
fabulous Ark….
"The weapon
is to be used against Japan between now and August 10th. I have told the Sec.
of War, Mr. Stimson, to use it so that military objectives and soldiers and
sailors are the target and not women and children. Even if the Japs are
savages, ruthless, merciless and fanatic, we as the leader of the world for the
common welfare cannot drop this terrible bomb on the old capital or the new [Kyoto
or Tokyo].
"He [Stimson]
and I are in accord. The target will be a purely military one and we will issue
a warning statement [known as the Potsdam Proclamation] asking the Japs
to surrender and save lives. I'm sure they will not do that, but we will have
given them the chance. It is certainly a good thing for the world that Hitler's
crowd or Stalin's did not discover this atomic bomb. It seems to be the most
terrible thing ever discovered, but it can be made the most useful."
4. Potsdam
Declaration, 1 August 1945, Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender,
July 26, 1945
(1) We-The
President of the United States, the President of the National Government of the
Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the
hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that Japan
shall be given an opportunity to end this war.
(2) The prodigious
land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and of China,
many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west, are poised
to strike the final blows upon Japan. This military power is sustained and
inspired by the determination of all the Allied Nations to prosecute the war
against Japan until she ceases to resist.
(4) The time has come for Japan to decide
whether she will continue to be controlled by those self-willed militaristic
advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to
the threshold of annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of reason.
(9) The Japanese
military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return
to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.
(10) We do not
intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation,
but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who
have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese Government shall remove
all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among
the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as
respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.
(11) Japan shall
be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit
the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those [industries] which
would enable her to re-arm for war. To this end, access to, as distinguished
from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese
participation in world trade relations shall be permitted.
(12) The occupying
forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives
have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the
freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and
responsible government.
(13) We call upon
the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all
Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their
good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter
destruction.
5. (MEMORANDUM
ON THE USE OF S-1 BOMB, Harrison-Bundy Files, RG 77, microfilm publication
M1108, folder 77, National Archives, Washington, DC).
On July 2, 1945,
Sec. of War Henry Stimson and Truman discussed a proposal by Stimson to call
for Japan to surrender. Stimson's memo to the President advised, "I
personally think that if in saying this we should add that we do not exclude a
constitutional monarchy under her present dynasty, it would substantially add
to the chances of acceptance". Stimson's proposed surrender demand stated
that the reformed Japanese government "may include a constitutional
monarchy under the present dynasty" (U.S. Dept. of State, Potsdam 1, pg.
889-894).
However, the
constitutional monarchy line was not included in the surrender demand,
known as the Potsdam Proclamation, that was broadcast on July 26th, in spite of
Stimson's eleventh hour protestations that it be left in (Diary of Henry L.
Stimson, 7/24/45, Yale Univ. Library, New Haven, Conn).
6. John McCloy, (Assistant Sec. of War)
"I have
always felt that if, in our ultimatum to the Japanese government issued from
Potsdam [in July 1945], we had referred to the retention of the emperor as a
constitutional monarch and had made some reference to the reasonable
accessibility of raw materials to the future Japanese government, it would have
been accepted. Indeed, I believe that even in the form it was delivered, there
was some disposition on the part of the Japanese to give it favorable consideration.
When the war was over I arrived at this conclusion after talking with a number
of Japanese officials who had been closely associated with the decision of the
then Japanese government, to reject the ultimatum, as it was presented. I
believe we missed the opportunity of effecting a Japanese surrender, completely
satisfactory to us, without the necessity of dropping the bombs."
McCloy quoted in
James Reston, Deadline, pg. 500.
7. GENERAL
DOUGLAS MacARTHUR
MacArthur
biographer William Manchester has described MacArthur's reaction to the
issuance by the Allies of the Potsdam Proclamation to Japan: "...the
Potsdam declaration in July, demand[ed] that Japan surrender unconditionally or
face 'prompt and utter destruction.' MacArthur was appalled. He knew that the
Japanese would never renounce their emperor, and that without him an orderly
transition to peace would be impossible anyhow, because his people would never
submit to Allied occupation unless he ordered it. Ironically, when the
surrender did come, it was conditional, and the condition was a continuation of
the imperial reign. Had the General's advice been followed, the resort to
atomic weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki might have been unnecessary."
William
Manchester, American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964, pg. 512.
8. Leo Szilard,
(The first scientist to conceive of how an atomic bomb might be made - 1933)
After Germany
surrendered, Szilard attempted to meet with President Truman. Instead, he was
given an appointment with Truman's Sec. of State to be, James Byrnes. In that
meeting of May 28, 1945, Szilard told Byrnes that the atomic bomb should not be
used on Japan. Szilard recommended, instead, coming to an international
agreement on the control of atomic weapons before shocking other nations by
their use:
"I thought
that it would be a mistake to disclose the existence of the bomb to the world
before the government had made up its mind about how to handle the situation
after the war. Using the bomb certainly would disclose that the bomb existed."
According to Szilard, Byrnes was not interested in international control:
"Byrnes... was concerned about Russia's postwar behavior. Russian troops
had moved into Hungary and Rumania, and Byrnes thought it would be very
difficult to persuade Russia to withdraw her troops from these countries, that
Russia might be more manageable if impressed by American military might, and
that a demonstration of the bomb might impress Russia." Szilard could see
that he wasn't getting though to Byrnes; "I was concerned at this point
that by demonstrating the bomb and using it in the war against Japan, we might
start an atomic arms race between America and Russia which might end with the
destruction of both countries.".
9. A PETITION
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, July 3, 1945
…. We, the
undersigned scientists, have been working in the field of atomic power for a
number of years. Until recently we have had to reckon with the possibility that
the United States might be attacked by atomic bombs during this war and that
her only defense might lie in a counterattack by the same means. Today with
this danger averted we feel impelled to say what follows:
The war has to be
brought speedily to a successful conclusion and the destruction of Japanese
cities by means of atomic bombs may very well be an effective method of
warfare. We feel, however, that such an attack on Japan could not be justified
in the present circumstances. We believe that the United States ought not to
resort to the use of atomic bombs in the present phase of the war, at least not
unless the terms which will be imposed upon Japan after the war are publicly
announced and subsequently Japan is given an opportunity to surrender.
If such public
announcement gave assurance to the Japanese that they could look forward to a
life devoted to peaceful pursuits in their homeland and if Japan still refused
to surrender, our nation would then be faced with a situation which might
require a re-examination of her position with respect to the use of atomic
bombs in the war.
Atomic bombs are
primarily a means for the ruthless annihilation of cities. Once they were
introduced as an instrument of war it would be difficult to resist for long the
temptation of putting them to such use.
The last few years
show a marked tendency toward increasing ruthlessness. At present our Air
Forces, striking at the Japanese cities, are using the same methods of warfare
which were condemned by American public opinion only a few years ago when
applied by the Germans to the cities of England. Our use of atomic bombs in
this war would carry the world a long way further on this path of ruthlessness.
Atomic power will
provide the nations with new means of destruction. The atomic bombs at our
disposal represent only the first step in this direction and there is almost no
limit to the destructive power which will become available in the course of
this development. Thus a nation which sets the precedent of using these newly
liberated forces of nature for purposes of destruction may have to bear the responsibility
of opening the door to an era of devastation on an unimaginable scale.
In view of the
foregoing, we, the undersigned, respectfully petition that you exercise your
power as Commander-in-Chief to rule that the United States shall not, in the present
phase of the war, resort to the use of atomic bombs.
Leo Szilard and 58
co-signers (Dr. Leo Szilard,
62, is a Hungarian-born physicist who helped persuade President Roosevelt to
launch the A-bomb project and who had a major share in it. In 1945, however, he
was a key figure among the scientists opposing use of the bomb.)
10. Leo Szilard, Interview: President Truman Did Not
Understand, U.S. News & World Report, August 15, 1960, pages
68-71.
Q In what
way? [did the bombing boomerang?]
A I think it made it very difficult for us to take the
position after the war that we wanted to get rid of atomic bombs because it
would be immoral to use them against the civilian population. We lost the moral
argument with which, right after the war, we might have perhaps gotten rid of
the bomb.
Let me say only
this much to the moral issue involved: Suppose Germany had developed two bombs
before we had any bombs. And suppose Germany had dropped one bomb, say, on
Rochester and the other on Buffalo, and then having run out of bombs she would
have lost the war. Can anyone doubt that we would then have defined the
dropping of atomic bombs on cities as a war crime, and that we would have
sentenced the Germans who were guilty of this crime to death at Nuremberg and
hanged them?
But, again, don't
misunderstand me. The only conclusion we can draw is that governments acting in
a crisis are guided by questions of expediency, and moral considerations are
given very little weight, and that America is no different from any other
nation in this respect.
11. Dwight
Eisenhower, Mandate For Change, pg. 380
"...in [July]
1945... Secretary of War Stimson, visiting my headquarters in Germany, informed
me that our government was preparing to drop an atomic bomb on Japan. I was one
of those who felt that there were a number of cogent reasons to question the
wisdom of such an act. ...
"During his recitation of the relevant
facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him
my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already
defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly
because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the
use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a
measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very
moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of 'face'. The
Secretary was deeply perturbed by my attitude..."
12. Admiral William D. Leahy (Chief of Staff to Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and
Harry Truman)
"It is my
opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of
no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already
defeated and ready to surrender because of the effective sea blockade and the
successful bombing with conventional weapons.
"The lethal
possibilities of atomic warfare in the future are frightening. My own feeling
was that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard
common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that
fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children."
- William Leahy, I
Was There, pg. 441.
13. Gar
Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb
Intercepted cables
showed Japan responding positively to a U.S. offer of a surrender based on the
"Atlantic Charter" as put forward in an official July 21, 1945
American radio broadcast. The key clause of the Charter promised that every
nation could choose its own form of government (which would have allowed Japan
to keep its Emperor).
On July 25 (reported
in MAGIC on July 26), an intercepted message from Japanese Foreign Minister
Togo to Ambassador Sato in Moscow cited the radio broadcast--and stated without
reservation:
The fact that
the Americans alluded to the Atlantic Charter is particularly worthy of
attention at this time. It is impossible for us to accept unconditional
surrender, no matter in what guise, but it is our idea to inform them by some
appropriate means that there is no objection to the restoration of peace on the
basis of the Atlantic Charter. (See p. 399, Chapter 31)
Rear Admiral
L. Lewis Strauss, special assistant to the Secretary of the Navy from 1944 to
1945 (and later chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission….recalled:
“I proposed to
Secretary Forrestal at that time that the weapon should be demonstrated. . . .
Primarily, it was because it was clear to a number of people, myself among
them, that the war was very nearly over. The Japanese were nearly ready to
capitulate. . . . My proposal to the Secretary was that the weapon should be
demonstrated over some area accessible to the Japanese observers, and where its
effects would be dramatic. I remember suggesting that a good
place--satisfactory place for such a demonstration would be a large forest of
cryptomaria [sic] trees not far from Tokyo. The cryptomaria tree is the
Japanese version of our redwood. . . . I anticipated that a bomb detonated at a
suitable height above such a forest . . . would [have] laid the trees out in
windrows from the center of the explosion in all directions as though they had
been matchsticks, and of course set them afire in the center. It seemed to me
that a demonstration of this sort would prove to the Japanese that we could
destroy any of their cities, their fortifications at will. . . . “(See p. 333,
Chapter 26)
In his "third
person" autobiography (co-authored with Walter Muir Whitehill) the
commander in chief of the U.S. Fleet and chief of Naval Operations, Ernest J.
King, stated:
The President in giving his approval for these
[atomic] attacks appeared to believe that many thousands of American troops would
be killed in invading Japan, and in this he was entirely correct; but King
felt, as he had pointed out many times, that the dilemma was an unnecessary
one, for had we been willing to wait, the effective naval blockade would, in
the course of time, have starved the Japanese into submission through lack of
oil, rice, medicines, and other essential materials. (See p. 327, Chapter 26)
14. Grayford C.
Payne, Bataan Death March survivor
“In
the latter part of June 1945, a note was posted in our camp. It was signed by
Hideki Tojo. And it said, 'The moment the first American soldier sets foot on
the Japanese mainland, all prisoners of war will be shot.' And they meant it. I
hadn't been a prisoner for fifteen minutes before they bayoneted a
fifteen-year-old Filipino kid right next to me - a kid so innocent he scraped
together this little dirt dam with his last bit of energy so he wouldn't bleed
on my uniform while he died. That is why all of us who were prisoners in Japan,
or were headed for it to probably die in the invasion, revere the Enola Gay. It
saved our lives.” September 26, 1994, Washington Post
15.
The Great Atomic Bomb Debate by Bryan McNulty
General
of the Army George C. Marshall worried that even with the two atomic bombings,
an invasion might be necessary. He had earlier observed that in a raid with
conventional bombs five months before, "we had 100,000 people killed in
Tokyo in one night and it had seemingly no effect whatsoever." In fact, it
took another six days after the second atomic bombing - and the foiling of an
attempted coup by military diehards who wanted the nation to fight to the end -
before Emperor Hirohito, in an unprecedented personal radio broadcast to his
nation, cited the "new and most cruel bomb" in announcing the
surrender.
"The U.S. knew that the Japanese had given no indication that they were going to surrender," says Ohio University World War II historian Marvin Fletcher. "The use of the bomb to convince the Japanese of what was obvious - that they had lost the war - was a necessary choice. Truman would have been derelict if he had done otherwise. The number of Americans and Japanese who would have died if the invasions had gone as planned would have been, in my mind, higher than the number of Japanese who died at Hiroshima."….
"The U.S. knew that the Japanese had given no indication that they were going to surrender," says Ohio University World War II historian Marvin Fletcher. "The use of the bomb to convince the Japanese of what was obvious - that they had lost the war - was a necessary choice. Truman would have been derelict if he had done otherwise. The number of Americans and Japanese who would have died if the invasions had gone as planned would have been, in my mind, higher than the number of Japanese who died at Hiroshima."….
While
the atomic deaths were horrific, Ohio University Professor of History Donald
Jordan says the horror was not unrivaled. The 1937 Rape of Nanjing, in which
Japanese troops took the Nationalist Army headquarters city and then spent
seven weeks killing up to 300,000 men, women, and children, by hand, is
arguably at least as horrific. If rational plans at high levels are the determinant
of "evil barbarism," Jordan points out that the deaths from the two
atomic bombs are pale shadows to the deaths resulting from the Japanese
military's systematic abuse and killings of prisoners of war and slave laborers
from Korea, China, and Southeast Asia. And Japan was the first country in any
of the theaters of war to create a deliberate firestorm in an undefended city
when it bombed Shanghai in 1932, says Jordan, the author of Chinese Boycotts
Versus Japanese Bombs…
Hamby
[author of Man of the People: A Life of Harry S. Truman] says the
historical record shows this: The Japanese had instructed their envoy in
Moscow, Naotake Sato, to seek Soviet mediation for a negotiated settlement, not
the unconditional surrender demanded by the United States and Britain at the
July 16 Potsdam Conference. Truman knew of this from coded messages broken by
the American military and from the Soviets themselves. Sato's intercepted
cables from Tokyo left the impression of a Japan unwilling to surrender and
preparing to wage a bitter, suicidal resistance that might last for months if
the nation was unable to get the terms it wanted.
"A distraught Sato on July 12 vainly urged an apparently gridlocked government in Tokyo to be specific and embrace unconditional surrender," Hamby says. "But the curt Japanese rejection of the Potsdam ultimatum on July 28 reinforced the worst American expectations."
The April 1945 U.S. invasion of Okinawa spelled the collapse of Premier General Hideki Tojo's government. His replacement, Admiral Kantaro Suzuki, told the Japanese Cabinet in June 1945 that thousands of kamikaze pilots would fly against enemy ships even in training planes, that millions of soldiers would fight what was called the "Decisive Battle" by suicide banzai charges, and that civilians would strap on explosives and throw themselves under enemy tanks.
To secure the approval of senior Army officials to his accession to premier, Suzuki affirmed that Japan's only course was to "fight to the very end" even if it meant the death of 100 million Japanese..
"A distraught Sato on July 12 vainly urged an apparently gridlocked government in Tokyo to be specific and embrace unconditional surrender," Hamby says. "But the curt Japanese rejection of the Potsdam ultimatum on July 28 reinforced the worst American expectations."
The April 1945 U.S. invasion of Okinawa spelled the collapse of Premier General Hideki Tojo's government. His replacement, Admiral Kantaro Suzuki, told the Japanese Cabinet in June 1945 that thousands of kamikaze pilots would fly against enemy ships even in training planes, that millions of soldiers would fight what was called the "Decisive Battle" by suicide banzai charges, and that civilians would strap on explosives and throw themselves under enemy tanks.
To secure the approval of senior Army officials to his accession to premier, Suzuki affirmed that Japan's only course was to "fight to the very end" even if it meant the death of 100 million Japanese..
"….
if you go across to the Asian mainland, the Chinese and Koreans say, 'The rest
of Asia were the victims, and the Japanese better get over that and quit
looking at themselves as victims or we won't trust them.' There are museums all
over China about the Japanese atrocities. The Chinese and Koreans have a very
different view of who were the victims."
By contrast, Hamby says the Germans, particularly West Germans, "have practically wallowed in war guilt for two generations. There is a big contrast with the Japanese."
By contrast, Hamby says the Germans, particularly West Germans, "have practically wallowed in war guilt for two generations. There is a big contrast with the Japanese."
According
to a report to President Roosevelt from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in September
1943, escaped prisoners had been providing accounts as early as April 1943 of
malnutrition, cruel workloads, widespread torture, and murder of U.S. and other
Allied prisoners of the Japanese. War planners worried about the fate of POWs
in the event of a prolonged war or an invasion of the Japanese home islands.
After the war, their fears proved well-founded: Of the 132,134 Americans,
British, and Australians taken prisoner by the Japanese, 27 percent - 35,756
-died in captivity.
According to a 1995 book on the planned invasion, Code-Name Downfall, by Thomas B. Allen and Norman Polmar, Soviet troops who liberated a POW camp in Mukden, Manchuria, found 3,000 prisoners who, like prisoners in Japan, had thought they were about to be murdered as the Soviets approached their camp. A Japanese directive described how prisoners were to be killed: "mass bombing, or poisonous smoke, poisons, decapitation... . In any case, it is the aim not to allow the escape of a single one, to annihilate them all, and not to leave any traces." When Red Army troops in Manchuria approached the headquarters of Japan's infamous Unit 731, where POWs were subjected to germ warfare and other experiments, the lieutenant general in charge, Shiro Ishii, ordered all buildings, equipment, and the hundreds of human test subjects destroyed and burned.
Although there were isolated reports of prisoners of war being executed even after the surrender was announced, many believed the abrupt end to the war without invasion was their salvation.
According to a 1995 book on the planned invasion, Code-Name Downfall, by Thomas B. Allen and Norman Polmar, Soviet troops who liberated a POW camp in Mukden, Manchuria, found 3,000 prisoners who, like prisoners in Japan, had thought they were about to be murdered as the Soviets approached their camp. A Japanese directive described how prisoners were to be killed: "mass bombing, or poisonous smoke, poisons, decapitation... . In any case, it is the aim not to allow the escape of a single one, to annihilate them all, and not to leave any traces." When Red Army troops in Manchuria approached the headquarters of Japan's infamous Unit 731, where POWs were subjected to germ warfare and other experiments, the lieutenant general in charge, Shiro Ishii, ordered all buildings, equipment, and the hundreds of human test subjects destroyed and burned.
Although there were isolated reports of prisoners of war being executed even after the surrender was announced, many believed the abrupt end to the war without invasion was their salvation.
16. Tony
Alessandro, former president of the U.S.S. Missouri Association, who
joined the Navy in the middle of the war at the age of 17 and "as a 19
year old kid" was present when the Japanese surrendered aboard the U.S.S.
Missouri on September 2, 1945.
"All we wanted
to do wanted to was to get home. A lot of us missed our childhood - those
things kids like to do at 17 and 18. When I left the Navy in 1946 I seem to go
back to my childhood and I began to play sports - baseball, football,
basketball for longer than kids do today. We were trying to pick up that lost
time.
"Then, I got
married when I was 24 years old. It was hard to find work between 1946-1950. I
finally got a good job in 1950, when the economy began to pick up after the
war. It was still tough times.
"Regarding
the Atom bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki - that caused a lot of
loss of life at the time - but those bombs SAVED many, many, many more. The
United States already had plans to invade Japan and had we done that, after we
fought in Okinawa, where we faced Japanese suicide planes, it would have been
much tougher if we had invaded Japan.
"If we had
not dropped the Atom bombs, the Japanese people would have lost 3 million
people and the Allies would have lost 1 million people. You are talking about 4
million people! We saved a lot of lives by dropping them."
17. Mary Mostert
“The Greatest Generation May Be Our Grandchildren,” December 12, 2001
In Hiroshima,
70,000 people died. In Nagasaki, 36,000 people died. However, in the German
attacks on England during World War II, 62,000 people died. In the conventional
bombing of Tokyo in 1945, 83,000 people died. And, in the Allied bombing of
Dresdon, Germany, 100,000 people died.
18. FDR AND TRUMAN : CONTINUITY
AND CONTEXT IN THE A-BOMB DECISION by HERMAN S. WOLK AND RICHARD P.
HALLION
….When Truman
called his military chiefs to the White House on 18 June 1945, uppermost in his
mind were the mounting American casualties in the Pacific island campaigns.
Most revealing of Truman’s mindset—and frequently neglected by historians—was
Adm William Leahy’s memorandum of 14 June calling the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
to this meeting. Leahy in-formed the JCS that Truman wanted
an estimate of the time required and an estimate of the losses in killed
and wounded that will result from an invasion of Japan proper.
He wants an estimate of the time and the losses that will result from an
effort to defeat Japan by isolation, blockade, and bombardment by sea and air
forces. . . .
It is his intention
to make his decisions on the campaign with the purpose of economizing to the
maximum extent possible in the loss of American lives.
Economy in the use
of time and in money cost is comparatively unimportant.4
In the middle of June 1945, Okinawa was the one
campaign that Truman had foremost in his mind. It had been a staggeringly
bloody campaign that killed or wounded about 49,000 Americans. The ferocity of
the Japanese defenders and the stunningly successful Japanese use of kamikaze
suicide planes gave Truman and the military leadership pause concerning
potential American casualties in an invasion of Kyushu (Operation Olympic), which
Truman approved on 18 June for 1 November 1945. Based on the American casualty
rate of 35 percent for Okinawa—emphasized to Truman during the meeting of 18
June 1945—the US could suffer approximately 268,000 casualties in a Kyushu
invasion, given the size of the invading forces.5
Also foreboding to Truman were the facts that some
6,000 to 8,000 kamikaze planes would be available to oppose a Kyushu landing
and that the Japanese could count on more than 2 million troops to defend the
home islands with great ferocity. Throughout World War II, the US Navy had 34
ships sunk, 368 damaged, 4,907 sailors killed, and 4,824 wounded from kamikaze
at-tacks. For approximately every seven kamikazes en-countered, the Navy had a
ship sunk or damaged. The fact was that Japanese hard-liners in the military
and the government were insisting on a fight to the finish, with the objective
of forcing a negotiated peace that would modify or destroy the surrender policy
of the Truman administration. They emphasized the losses that the Americans had
suffered on Okinawa. The US Army’s medical plan for Operation Olympic estimated
that total battle and nonbattle casualties (not including dead) could be
394,859.
….Had the atomic bombs not been used, would Japan have
surrendered prior to the invasion of Kyushu, scheduled for 1 November 1945?
This answer, of course, cannot be determined. However, had the B-29 campaign
continued for several more months, more Japanese would have been killed than at
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine any other means
whereby Japan could have surrendered with casualties equivalent to or less than
those experienced at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Japan had been defeated but was
not willing to surrender. The Japanese military and government were, in effect,
holding their own people hostage.
Both Hiroshima and Nagasaki were, under the principles
of international law, legitimate military targets for attack. Both had
extensive armament factories as well as war-related industries, and both contributed
significantly to Japanese military transportation networks. Further, both had
robust military establishments. Hiroshima, for example, was the headquarters of
the Japanese Second Army—virtually destroyed in the atomic bombing of the city.
Beyond this rationale, the decision to drop the atomic bomb on both of these
tar-gets did not constitute an act of aggression against a foe already reduced
to impotence by Allied attack. Indeed, in August 1945, fighting still raged
across Asia: an invasion of Malaya was planned for later in the year. In
particular, hundreds of thousands of Allied prisoners were in mortal danger. By
this time, 43 percent of the prisoners in Japanese hands (almost 400,000
captives) had died—a clear measure of the brutality of Japanese rule overall.
(The toll of Japanese rule is approximately 20 million dead.) As recent
scholarship has shown, clear evidence exists that, had the Allies invaded, the
Japanese would have slaughtered these prisoners of war.7 Also worthy of note is
the fact that Japan had under way a vigorous program to develop an atomic
bomb.8
19.
President Harry S. Truman and the atomic bomb, History Today, August 1995, by
Alonzo Hamby
On June 18th, the
president met with his top military officials to discuss the possible scenarios
for ending the war against Japan. They recommended an invasion of Kyushu no
later than November 1st. The operation would be enormous: 766,000 American
assault troops engaging an estimated 350,000 Japanese defenders. It would be
followed in 1946 by a decisive campaign near Tokyo on the main island of
Honshu.
Would the Kyushu
operation, Truman asked, be 'another Okinawa closer to Japan'? With
questionable optimism, the military chiefs of staff predicted the casualties
would be somewhat lighter. Still their estimate for the first thirty days was
31,000 casualties. Truman gave his reluctant approval, but not without saying
he hoped 'there was a possibility of preventing an Okinawa from one end of
Japan to another'.
In fact, Pentagon
planners were at work on estimates that projected 132,000 casualties (killed,
wounded, missing) for Kyushu, another 90,000 or so for Honshu. Of these,
probably a quarter would be fatalities. The figures were not wholly worked out
by the June 18th, meeting but they would be given to Truman in due course and
would constitute the estimates upon which he acted. In later years, he
exaggerated them, but they required no magnification to make the atomic bomb a
compelling option.
….The Japanese
surrender offer put before Truman on August 10th, still insisted on retention
of the emperor. Only Secretary of State Byrnes was reluctant to accept it.
Truman opted for a response asserting that the Japanese message met American
terms with the understanding that the emperor would be subject to the Allied
supreme commander. At a Cabinet meeting, he declared there would be no more
atomic bombings. Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace recorded his attitude: 'He
said the thought of wiping out another 100,000 people was too horrible. He
didn't like the idea of killing, as he said, "all those kids"'.
….At the August
10th cabinet meeting, Truman declared ('most fiercely', according to Wallace)
that he expected the Russians to stall on the surrender in order to grab as
much of Manchuria as possible, and that if China and Britain agreed to the
American terms, he would not wait for the Russians. Scholars of the Left invoke
such bits and pieces of anti-Soviet rhetoric as proof that the bombs were
dropped not to compel a Japanese surrender but to intimidate the USSR. Yet
there is no credible evidence in Truman's personal contemporary writings or his
later accounts that he saw the use of the bomb as a way of making a point to
the Russians -- although he clearly thought its existence would strengthen the
hand of the United States.
20. Martin J.
Sherwin, Dartmouth College, Oxford Companion to World War II
The military use
of atomic weapons was expected not only to end the war; it was assumed it would
help to organize an American peace. While these expectations and decisions may
be understandable in the context of four years of scientific secrecy and brutal
war, they were not inevitable. They were avoidable. In the end, that is the
most important lesson of Hiroshima for the nuclear age.
21. Minutes of
the second meeting of the Target Committee Los Alamos, May 10-11, 1945
…7. Psychological
Factors in Target Selection
A. It was agreed
that psychological factors in the target selection were of great importance.
Two aspects of this are (1) obtaining the greatest psychological effect against
Japan and (2) making the initial use sufficiently spectacular for the
importance of the weapon to be internationally recognized when publicity on it
is released.
B. In this respect
Kyoto has the advantage of the people being more highly intelligent and hence
better able to appreciate the significance of the weapon. Hiroshima has the
advantage of being such a size and with possible focusing from nearby mountains
that a large fraction of the city may be destroyed. The Emperor's palace in Tokyo
has a greater fame than any other target but is of least strategic value.
22. Leaflets dropped on cities in Japan warning
civilians about the atomic bomb, dropped c. August 6, 1945
TO THE JAPANESE PEOPLE:
America asks that you take immediate heed of what we say on this leaflet.
America asks that you take immediate heed of what we say on this leaflet.
We are in possession of
the most
destructive explosive ever devised by man. A single one of our newly
developed atomic bombs is actually the equivalent in explosive power to what
2000 of our giant B-29s can carry on a single mission. This awful fact is one
for you to ponder and we solemnly assure you it is grimly
accurate.
We have just begun to
use this weapon against your homeland. If you still have any doubt, make
inquiry as to what happened to Hiroshima when just one atomic bomb fell on that
city.
Before using this bomb
to destroy every resource of the military by which they are prolonging this
useless war, we ask that you now petition the Emperor to end the war. Our
president has outlined for you the thirteen consequences of an honorable
surrender. We urge that you accept these consequences and begin the work of
building a new, better and peace-loving Japan.
You should take steps
now to cease military resistance. Otherwise, we shall resolutely employ this
bomb and all our other superior weapons to promptly and forcefully end the war.
EVACUATE YOUR CITIES.
Source: Harry S. Truman
Library, Miscellaneous historical document file, no. 258.
23. Truman Speech, August 9, 1945 (excerpt)
The world will
note that the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, a military base. That
was because we wished in this first attack to avoid, insofar as possible, the
killing of civilians. But that attack is only a warning of things to come. If
Japan does not surrender, bombs will have to be dropped on her war industries
and, unfortunately, thousands of civilian lives will be lost. I urge Japanese
civilians to leave industrial cities immediately, and save themselves from
destruction.
24. Excerpt
from public statement by President Truman. This was the first time he publicly
gave a reason for using the atomic bomb on Japan 8/6/45:
"The Japanese
began the war from the air at Pearl Harbor. They have been repaid many fold.
"If they do
not now accept our terms they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like
of which has never been seen on this earth." (Public Papers of the
Presidents, Harry S. Truman, 1945, pg. 197, 199).
25. Testimony of
Hatchobori Streetcar Survivors
Seven hundred and fifty meters from ground zero, these are the testimonies of the passengers
who were on the same streetcar in a Hatchobori area when the atomic bomb fell.
A little after eight in the morning on August 6, the streetcar for Koi left
Hiroshima Station. And at 8:15 it approached Hatchobori Station, 780 meters
from the hypocenter and an intense flash and blast engulfed the car, instantly
setting it on fire. It is said that seventy cars were running in the city at
the same time. They were an important means of transportation for the citizens,
and all the trains were packed with people since it was the morning rush hour.
Nearly 100 passengers are said to have been on board on the streetcar which was
near Hatchobori. But the survival of only ten have been confirmed to date.
Seven out of ten have recorded their testimonies on this video tape.
Tomiko Sasaki, 17 on that day, was on her way to her
friend's house in Funairi with two classmates as it was their holiday from
student mobilization labor. Approximately two weeks after the bombing, her two
classmates died.
INTERVIEWER: Were three of you on the same part of the
car?
SASAKI: Yes. I was standing in front here and the others
were next to me. There was the flash and darkness. I think I was unconscious
for a while. We came to and called each other's names. My friends complained of
the heat and terrible pain. I saw that one side of her body had been badly
burned. There was a water tank for fire prevention, but the water wasn't clear
due to all the dust. I put my handkerchief in the water and I put it over her
burns, but she went on crying in pain. Both of my friends were burned. As for
myself, flesh was hanging from my whole face was bloody. Fortunately I escaped
from being burnt. I think it made a big difference that I was not burned. In
fact, I think that saved my life.
Eiko Taoka, then 21, was heading for Funairi with her
one year old son to secure wagon in preparation for her move out of the
building which was to be evacuated. Her son died of radiation sickness on
August 28.
TAOKA: When we were near in Hatchobori and since I had
been holding my son in my arms, the young woman in front of me said, "I
will be getting off here. Please take this seat." We were just changing
places when there was a strange smell and sound. It suddenly became dark and
before I knew it, I had jumped outside.
INTERVIEWER: What about your son?
TAOKA: I held him firmly and looked down on him. He had
been standing by the window and I think fragments of glass had pierced his
head. His face was a mess because of the blood flowing from his head. But he
looked at my face and smiled. His smile has remained glued in my memory. He did
not comprehend what had happened. And so he looked at me and smiled at my face
which was all bloody. I had plenty of milk which he drank all throughout that
day. I think my child sucked the poison right out of my body. And soon after
that he died. Yes, I think that he died for me.
Shizuno Tochiki, 23 at that time, was on her way to her
office in Kogo. Immediately after the bombing, she had a high fever which
lasted for ten days. She's suffered the symptoms of radiation sickness, the
purple spots appeared all over her body and her hair fell out. It was only
after one month that she was finally able to get up.
TOCHIKI: I think the air-raid warning had been lifted,
so I left for Hatchobori without worrying. Then, there was a flash and a big
sound which is known as ``Pika-don''. The train shock and it seemed to me as if
a flash had directly entered my eyes. It was extremely hot. Because of the
jolt, people fell right on top of each other. I think I was at a very bottom. I
thought I would be crashed to death in a little while because I was so small
and had the weight of all those people on top of me. But one by the people on
top finally left the car. They ran with all their might along the railroad
tracks. I could hear someone shout, ``Another hit and we're finished.'' But I
could only see people's shadows. When I gained consciousness, I was in a bed. I
don't remember how many days it took until I could walk again. One day I asked
for a cane, but I couldn't walk straight since my legs were so thin and so
shaky. I staggered towards a mirror and I fell utterly, completely miserable as
I had no hair, all my hair was gone. But just being able to walk to the next
room made me so happy.
Keiko Matsuda, then 14, on her way to Miyajima with two
friends since they had no mobilized labor on that day. One of her friends who
had been closest to the front and received the worst burns died in the
first-aid station in Nukushina.
MATSUDA: It was very, very hot. I touched my skin and
it just peeled right off. The driver of the streetcar was not in sight. I
thought he had been quick to run away but now I think that he was probably
hurled outside in the blast. It was around August 25 that a pile of my hair
just fell off all at once. I had a high fever and maggots infested in my eyes.
INTERVIEWER: In your eyes?
MATSUDA: Yes. I was afflicted with erysipelas as well.
I had two children, but I had not told them about this experience. And I don't
want to talk about it. But this time many people are testifying together and
since I've been asked, I will talk. But I have tried to avoid it until now.
Akira Ishida, then a 17 year old junior air man in the
army, had the day off and was going to Miyajima with his elder brother to pray
for good luck in the war. His elder brother died in September 1945 of radiation
sickness.
ISHIDA: Several months later, I can remember, I
remember a cold morning, I don't know why but my mother always kept a round
hand mirror by my pillow, which I picked up without thinking. I looked at my
face and I saw something so shiny on the corner of my head. Using all my
energy, I called out to my mother who was in the kitchen, and I said, ``Mother!
My hair is growing back!'' She was so happy that she held me and she cried.
I'll never forget that day and the feel of the tears that my mother shed for me
while she held me in her arms. It still comes back to me even though the people
here are of different ages, we are also all of the same age. On August 6th,
1945, all of us died once and then, we were brought back to life. We were all
born again. And we're in our second life now. Everyone gathered here today is
now 41 years old if you count the number the years from the bombing. It's like
a class reunion. I feel that we must testify in the hope that our experience
will help to keep mankind from perishing.
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